The Information Highway Must Pay Its Way through Cities:  A Discussion of the Authority of State and Local Governments to Be Compensated for the Use of Public Rights-of-Way by West, Clarence A.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1
1995
The Information Highway Must Pay Its Way
through Cities: A Discussion of the Authority of
State and Local Governments to Be Compensated
for the Use of Public Rights-of-Way
Clarence A. West
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clarence A. West, The Information Highway Must Pay Its Way through Cities: A Discussion of the Authority of State and Local Governments
to Be Compensated for the Use of Public Rights-of-Way, 1 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 29 (1995).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol1/iss1/2
THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY MUST PAY
ITS WAY THROUGH CITIES: A DISCUSSION
OF THE AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS TO BE COMPENSATED FOR
THE USE OF PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY
Clarence A. West*
Cite As: Clarence A. West, The Information Highway Must Pay Its
Way Through Cities: A Discussion of the Authority of State and Local
Governments to be Compensated for the Use of Public Rights-Of-Way,
1 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 29 (1995)
available at <http://www.mttlr.org/volone/west.pdf>
In the ever-changing telecommunications industry there appears to
be an enormous amount of confusion not only as to the appropriate
amount of compensation chargeable to the users of public rights-of-way,
but also as to the very authority of state and local governments to re-
quire compensation. This was not always the case. It has long been a
well-settled legal principle that local governments may receive reason-
able "rental" compensation from private commercial entities for their
use of local public property for private economic gain, even where fed-
eral statutory law restricts local governments from denying access to
rights-of-way for telecommunications services.' For example, in a turn-
of-the-century case construing the applicability of a federal law to a
telegraph company's use of local public property, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, citing several previous United States Supreme Court cases,
stated:
The Congress of the United States has no power to take private
property for public purposes without compensation, and it can
no more take the property of a state or one of its municipalities
than the property of an individual. The acts of Congress ...
conferred on the defendant [telecommunications company] no
* Of Counsel, Dow, Cogburn & Friedman, P.C., Houston, Texas. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dow, Cogburn &
Friedman, P.C. or its members.
I. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
City of Newport, 76 S.W. 159 (Ky. 1903); Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224
U.S. 160 (1912); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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right to use the streets and alleys of the city ... which belonged
to the municipality.2
Although this principle has seemed to be well-settled since 1903,
it may be revisited again 92 years later in light of (1) contemporary
constitutional challenges, (2) advances in technology, (3) a recent Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") action on video dialtone
services, and (4) proposed Congressional telecommunications legisla-
tion involving telecommunications companies' use of local rights-of-
way for the "information superhighway"-that cornucopia of telecom-
munications services. This article will first examine the municipal and
federal authority behind this established legal principle and then analyze
the current issues facing it.
I. THE WELL-SETtLED LAW
A. Municipal Authority to Grant Franchises
and Receive Compensation
As mentioned above, it has long been a well-settled legal concept
that local governments may receive reasonable rental compensation
from private commercial entities for their use of local public property
for private economic gain.3 Local governments' regulatory authority
over their rights-of-way usually emanates from state constitutional or
statutory authority granted to cities. In most states, the state itself ini-
tially has title and authority to regulate the public streets and rights-of-
way, as the property is dedicated for public use.5 A majority of states
delegate the authority to municipalities by statute, while a minority of
states grant franchises to the telecommunications provider directly.
6
While the majority of states do allow cities to be compensated, several
2. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 76 S.W. 159, 160 (Ky. 1903) (citing St.
Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) and Postal Tel. Co. v. Baltimore, 156
U.S. 210 (1895)).
3. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
City of Newport, 76 S.W. 159 (Ky. 1903); Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224
U.S. 160 (1912); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
4. 10A EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 30.39.10 (3d ed. 1990).
5. 10A id. § 30.39.
6. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1175(2), 1181 (West 1994). But see, e.g.,
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 336 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1959) (rights to a tele-
phone franchise are granted directly to the franchisee pursuant to state law).
The Use of Public Rights-of-Way
do not.7 The statutory law in each state regarding the city's authority to
grant franchises should be reviewed in detail as to the extent of that
authority and any limitations on it.
A city-wide street franchise is a special kind of contract granted by
a municipality. It is a contract that gives the city's permission to a pri-
vate company-a franchisee-to use the public streets and rights-of-
way for private economic gain. The franchisee pays the city for the use
of the public streets in the form of franchise fees. These franchise fees
that are paid to a city as compensation for using the public streets are
sometimes called "street rentals"--they are not taxes.8 A franchise fee is
the consideration paid for the rights granted by the franchise, and serves
as compensation for use of the public property.9 The payment of fran-
chise fees is a contractual obligation of the franchisee.'0
B. Federal Authority to Affect State and Local
Rights to Compensation
While Congress may certainly preempt state and local governments'
regulatory role in the interstate telecommunications industry, Congress
cannot, without compensation, appropriate or "give" the local public
rights-of-way to telecommunications service providers without reason-
able compensation for the use of the local public rights-of-way."
The law in this area arose primarily in the late 1800s and early
1900s through the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of
federal legislation passed in 1866 to assist the infant telegraph
7. City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 744 (1935). The states that are mentioned in City of Tulsa that could collect fran-
chise fees in 1935 are: Illinois, Tennessee, Colorado, Connecticut and South Dakota. The
ones that the court notes could not charge a fee are: Kansas, Wisconsin, Iowa and Oklahoma.
But see AT&T v. Village of Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. 1993) (disallowing city
franchise fees pursuant to state law on a non-local fiber optics cable line).
8. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Fleming v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 138 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 560 (1941); City
of Springfield v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 97 N.E. 672 (Ill. 1912); Lewis v. Nashville Gas &
Heating Co., 40 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. 1931); Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City of Nash-
ville, 152 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1941). Compare Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., 845
F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. 111. 1994) (construing franchise fees as "taxes") with Robinson Protec-
tive Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371 (3rd Cir. 1978) (allowing that under
state law franchise fees were "rental," but under the federal "Tax Injunction Act" they were
taxes).
9. See, e.g., Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 795 P.2d 298 (Idaho 1990). This case pro-
vides an excellent contemporary analysis on the nature of a franchise and authority to charge
a franchise fee. Id. at 304-07.
10. Id. See also City of Jamestown v. Home Tel., 109 N.Y.S. 297 (N.Y. App. Div.
1908); City of Mitchell v. Dakota Central Tel. Co., 127 N.W. 582 (S.D. 1910).
11. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1893).
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industry. 2 The same legal principles, as established in those cases, are
still cited as they apply to cable television companies' contemporary use
of local public rights-of-way. 3
In the Telegraph Act of 1866, Congress granted rights to telegraph
companies 4 to use federal "post roads" (mail routes) for interstate tele-
graph operations and prohibited states and local governments from
interfering with those operations. 5 In St. Louis v. Western Union Tel.
Co., Western Union challenged the right of a city to impose a pole
charge on its use of the local rights-of-way, in light of the Telegraph Act
of 1866.16 The United States Supreme Court held, in this 1893 case, that
cities could require telegraph companies to pay reasonable street rental
franchise fee payments for the use of the public streets, as the federal
statute did not grant an "unrestricted right to appropriate the public
property of a State."' 7 The Court went on to say:
No one would suppose that a franchise from the Federal gov-
ernment to a corporation ... to construct interstate.., lines of
... communication, would authorize it to enter upon the private
property of an individual, and appropriate it without compensa-
tion.... [T]he franchise ... would be... subordinate to the
right of the individual not to be deprived of his property without
just compensation. And the principle is the same when, under
the grant of a franchise from the national government, a corpo-
ration assumes to enter upon property of a public nature
belonging to a State.... [l]t is not within the competency of the
national government to dispossess the State of such control and
use, or appropriate the same to its own benefit, or the benefit of
any its corporations or grantees, without suitable compensation
12. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878). The Supreme
Court characterized the early telegraph service as follows: "The electric telegraph marks an
epoch in the progress of time. [It has] become one of the necessities of commerce. It is in-
dispensable as a means of inter-communication, but especially is it so in commercial
transactions." Id.
13. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,428-30 (1982).
14. While telephone companies argued they had the same rights as telegraph companies
under the federal statute, that argument was rejected in Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761 (1899).
15. 14 Stat. 221 (1866). Cf. City of Toledo v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 F. 10 (6th
Cir. 1901). In a narrowing of what the telegraph companies could use the "post roads" for,
the court opined that the federal statute only authorized a telegraph company to use the post
roads for interstate business and that it did not grant the right to use the roads for a "district"
telegraph operation, i.e., local business. Id. at 14-15. See also City of Memphis v. Postal Tel.
Cable Co., 145 F. 602 (6th Cir. 1906); Mayor of Nashville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co.,
145 F. 607 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906).
16. 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
17. Id. at 100.
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to the State. This rule extends to streets and highways; they are
public property of the State. 8
The Court concluded that under the Telegraph Act of 1866 "the oc-
cupation by this interstate commerce company of the streets cannot be
denied by the city; .. all ... [the city] can insist upon is ... reasonable
compensation for the space in the streets thus exclusively appropriated
"19
On rehearing of this case, a challenge was made as to the city's right
to charge the fee pursuant to the state statutory authority delegated to it
to "regulate the streets." 20 The Supreme Court held: "[T]he power to
require payment of some reasonable sum for the exclusive use of a por-
tion of the streets was within the grant of power to regulate the use.' 2'
In delivering the opinion of the Court in Western Union Tel. Co. v.
City of Richmond,2 Justice Holmes construed the Telegraph Act of 1866
to avoid the takings issue as applied to public property: "[T]he statute is
only permissive, not a source of positive rights.... [The statute] gives
the appellant [the telegraph company] no right to use the soil of the
streets, even though post roads, as against private owners, or as against
the city or state, where it owns the land."'
The vitality of the century-old St. Louis opinion was evidenced
again in 1982 by the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp.24 In Loretto, the Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of a New York state statute which required landlords to
allow cable television companies to install cable wires in buildings
without any compensation to the property owner.' The Court held that
the State of New York could not require such use of private property
without compensation even though the cable wires did not take up a
great deal of space.26 As the Court stated, "a taking does not depend on
whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread box."2
18. Id. at 100-01.
19. Id. at 105.
20. 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
21. Id. at 470.
22. 224 U.S. 160 (1912).
23. Id. at 169. The last significant case of this series was in 1919, in which the Court
tersely disposed of the issue of compensation. In Postal TeL-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond,
the Court concluded: "Even interstate business must pay its way-in this case for its right-
of-way and the expense to others incident to the use of it." 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
24. 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
25. Id. at 438-40.
26. Id. at438 n.16.
27. Id. This same thought was expressed another way in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Webb, 393 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). The telephone company argued that the place-
ment of telephone cable on the private landowner's property did not give rise to
1994-19951
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Again, while the authority of the state or a city to receive compen-
sation for the use of public streets has been upheld many times by the
Supreme Court,' the extent of any particular city's authority to regulate
those public streets and receive compensation ultimately turns on the
authority granted it by state law, as cities are wholly creatures of state
law.2
II. CURRENT ISSUES FACING THE WELL-SETTLED LAW
A. Contemporary Constitutional Issues Concerning Franchise Fees
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198430 (the "1984 Cable
Act") has provided the overriding guidance as to cable television fran-
chises and franchise fees.3 One item the 1984 Cable Act made clear was
a federal mandate for a local franchise. 2
The 1984 Cable Act and the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 19923 (the "1992 Cable Act") (collectively, the
"Cable Act" ),3 as did the FCC regulations35 before them, expressly pro-
vide that compensation be paid to the franchising authority for the use
of the local public property.36 The Cable Act permits up to 5% of the
cable operators' revenues as a franchise fee.37 Absent this 5% compen-
sation, the constitutionality of any mandated use of the public rights-of-
way could be called into question, in light of St. Louis v. Western Union
compensation as "'not one single iota of defendant's land was actually taken."' Id. at 121
(quoting appellant's final complaint). To that argument, the court tersely replied: "If no land
has been taken, where is the cable?" Id.
28. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Rich-
mond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
29. 10A EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 30.39.10 (3d ed. 1990).
30. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. (1988)).
31. Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 621-27, 98 Stat. at 2786-94 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 541-47).
32. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1557-63 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (reviewing the history of cable television jurisdic-
tion between local governments and the FCC).
33. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
§§ 521-611 (Supp. IV 1992)).
34. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
35. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1983).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 542 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988).
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Tel. Co.3" and its progeny, including Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.
39
A number of cases comment on the possible violations of the Tak-
ings Clause that might arise under section 541(a)(2) of the Cable Acte if
it were construed as mandating access to non-publicly dedicated ease-
ments and rights-of-way.4 All of these cases discuss the takings issue in
the context of a physical taking. Therefore, any physical taking in the
use of public properties by additional equipment or lines would violate
the Takings Clause as interpreted by Loretto and the aforementioned
line of cases.
Cable television franchisees, as mediums of information, raise First
Amendment issues as to their regulation and taxation. A number of
cases do indicate, however, that cable television franchisees can be
regulated and there can be local franchise fees and taxes imposed upon
them, so long as they are incidental and not overly burdensome on the
medium.42
38. 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
39. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See also TCI of North Dakota, Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co.,
II F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993), in which the Circuit Court in dicta discusses the possible
Constitutional problems of the 1984 Cable Act taking "undedicated" property. It also cites a
number of other circuit court opinions which discuss this same issue. Id. Of course, the Ca-
ble Act provides for a 5% fee as compensation. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
41. Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 159-60 (3rd Cir. 1989); Cable Holdings
of Georgia v. McNeil Real Estate, 953 F.2d 600, 609 (11 th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182
(1992); Media Gen. Cable v. Sequoyah Condominium Council, 991 F.2d 1169, 1175 (4th
Cir. 1993); TCI of North Dakota, Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir.
1993); Century Southwest Cable Television v. CIIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.
1994).
42. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communication, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 495
(1986) (holding that a cable television franchise does raise First Amendment issues, but
leaving open the extent of governmental regulations and the standard of judicial review
pending further development of the facts at the trial court); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439 (1991) (upholding an Arkansas general sales tax on cable television revenue against a
First Amendment challenge, even though the print media had been exempted from the tax);
Telestat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 406-07 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (upholding franchise fees against a constitutional attack, as long as they were related
to the costs of administration and to the fair market value of the public rights-of-way); Chi-
cago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 678 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. IM. 1988),
aff'd, 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) (holding it was not a
First Amendment violation to assess a contractually agreed upon fine on a cable operator for
violation of the cable agreement); Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d
1084 (3rd Cir. 1988) (without reaching the constitutional issue, holding that franchise fees
were an essential part of the franchise contract, which were supportable as a term of the
contract, because the payments were rent for commercial use of the public rights of way);
Group W. Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 974-75 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding that they would uphold franchise fees which were reasonably based on the fair
market value of the property and administrative costs). But see Century Fed., Inc. v. City of
Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that a franchise fee violated the First
1994-1995]
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In Telestat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Dist. 4' a United
States District Court in Florida held that a franchise fee on a cable tele-
vision franchise did not violate the First Amendment, as the franchise
fee constituted "the costs associated with the City's administration of
the franchise and the reasonable rental value of the cable operator's use
of the City's rights-of-way,"
However, in Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held that the
cable television franchise fees were unconstitutional based on the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 5 The court concluded that (1) the fees were excessive and
infringed on First Amendment rights and (2) the fact that different users
of the rights-of-way were paying different amounts of money consti-
tuted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Thus, although local
franchise fees are allowed, some courts may review them to ensure that
they are reasonable.
Telephone franchisees or telephone service providers have argued in
the past that cities and states violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution when they impose state or local charges on interstate ac-
cess fee revenue.47 The Supreme Court has rejected that argument and
has upheld such charges against the Commerce Clause challenges when
there is a sufficient nexus with the state and when the charges (1) are
fairly apportioned, (2) do not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and (3) are fairly related to services which the state provides to taxpay-
ers. An example of a sufficient nexus is where an interstate call ends or
begins in the state and is billed, charged or paid in the state or locale.49
B. Advances in Technology
Perhaps the more difficult issue is whether the current franchise
grants the right to provide additional services, which are now techni-
cally available, or whether the franchise restricts the provided services
to those expressly or technologically available at the time the franchise
and Fourteenth Amendments where the City of Palo Alto did not charge all users of the
rights-of-way a franchise fee, and those that were charged, had different charges).
43. 773 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
44. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
45. 710 F. Supp. 1559, 1568-78 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
46. Id. at 1576. A 2% fee was charged the gas & electric company and a 5% fee was
charged the cable operator. Id.
47. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
48. 488 U.S. at 267-68 (upholding a state tax on telephone interstate access fee
charges).
49. Id. at 262-63.
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was granted. That, of course, will depend on the exact language of the
franchise and the state law on construction of those contracts. It should
be noted that in most ktates, as franchises are privileges granted by the
governing authority, they are construed to the benefit of the City and
against the franchisees.0 One other variable is whether the new technol-
ogy or service involves an additional physical taking of property or if
additional lines are needed to provide the services; i.e., whether there
are additional burdens on the estate which alter the magnitude of the
servitude on the property.
Putting aside the issue of whether the franchise itself grants the right
to provide the "new" services, if the services are merely an additional
electronic impulse they would not seem to be an additional servitude on
the easement. On the other hand, if the current use of the easement is
akin to telegraph service in the sense that there are few streets being
used in the city, while the new telecommunications service requires the
use of all the public streets and rights-of-way, then that new use would
seem to pose an additional burden on the servitude of the public prop-
erty. The Tennessee Supreme Court in 1907 provided an excellent
discussion of this issue in Home Tel. Co. v. Mayor of Nashville." The
court discussed why a telephone company does not have the same rights
and privileges under a Tennessee statute as those granted to a telegraph
company." It noted the additional burdens and difficulties imposed by a
telephone business versus a telegraph business in using the city streets. 3
Specifically, it indicated that while there are only a few lines and only a
few people involved in the operation of a telegraph system within a city,
many lines (to every residence and business) and many people are in-
volved in the operation of a telephone systemN The case cites
extensively the 1899 Supreme Court case of Richmond v. Southern Bell
Tel. Co.,55 which reached the same conclusion as to the enormous in-
crease in the burdens placed on public property by a telephone company
as opposed to a telegraph company."
50. See, e.g., Incorporated Town of Hemstead v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 206 S.W.2d 227,
230 (Tex. 1947). See generally 6 EUGENE MCQUILLIN & JOHN D. LATTA, THE LAW OF MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20.53 (3d ed. 1969); 12 EUGENE MCQUILLIN & CHARLES R. P.
KEATING, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.45 (3d ed. 1986).
51. 101 S.W. 770 (Tenn. 1907).
52. Id. at 774-75.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 774.
55. 174 U.S. 761 (1899).
56. Home Tel. Co. v. Mayor of Nashville, 101 S.W. 770 (Tenn. 1907). See also Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 76 S.W. 159, 160 (Ky. 1903), in which the court specifi-
cally said that "the [placement of telegraph] poles and wires in the streets are a serious
1994-1995]
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Several cases have addressed the issue as to whether easements dedi-
cated for public utility uses are compatible with subsequent technological
improvements.57 The general rule seems to be that technological im-
provements may utilize the easement so long as the new use is
substantially compatible with the original dedication or grant and does
not substantially increase the burden on the easement. 8 In C/R TV, Inc.
v. Shannondale, Inc.," the developer of a residential subdivision argued
that cable television service was not a compatible use and/or it substan-
tially increased the burden on the easement granted to a telephone
utility. The court concluded that in this case technological innovations
fit within the use of the easements as long as such innovations did not
increase significantly the burden on the estate.' The court found that as
the telephone wires, which were fiber optic, already carry video images,
there was in fact no distinction between the two-cable television and
telephone lines that transmit video signals-which would result in any
increased burden.6
However, in 1971, the Fifth Circuit took another view, focusing on
what services were authorized to be provided rather than focusing on the
additional burdens placed on the easement estate due to "technological
innovations." 62 While this case primarily upheld the initial FCC Cable-
Telco cross-ownership ban, the court, in dicta, stated that providing ca-
ble television services was not incidental to providing telephone
services. 63 The significance of this is that if cable service is not inciden-
tal to providing telephone service, then local telephone franchises may
not have granted the authority to the telephone company to provide any
other telecommunications services, including video dialtone service (as
discussed below) under that local franchise. Therefore a new video fran-
chise may be required to obtain that authority, notwithstanding that
there is no increase in the "burden" on the easements by providing this
"technological innovation."
servitude [on the public property], and... [the telegraph company] could not impose this
servitude upon the city, thus taking its [the city's] property without compensation."
57. See Michels v. Times Mirror Cable TV of Louisville, Inc., No. 85-CA-1081-MR
(Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); C/R TV, Inc. v. Shannon-
dale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994).
58. Michels, No. 85-CA-1081-MR, slip op. at 2; CIR TV, 27 F.3d at 108.
59. 27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 108-09.
61. Id. at 109 ("The transmissions of a telephone company are virtually indistinguish-
able from transmissions of a non-telephone company transmitting television signals for
purposes of a pole and. wire easement grant."). See also Greater Worchester Cablevision, Inc.
v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Mass. 1985); Michels v. Times Mirror Ca-
ble T.V. of Louisville, Inc., No. 85-CA-1081-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1986).
62. General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. Id. at 860.
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C. FCC Activity
In late 1994, the 19916" and 199265 FCC video dialtone decisions
were upheld by the D.C. Circuit in National Cable Television Ass'n v.
FCC.6 These decisions allow local exchange telephone companies to
provide video dialtone services (essentially a video programmer's elec-
tronic pipeline) without a cable television franchise under the 1984
Cable Act and the 1992 Cable Act.67 The D.C. Circuit concluded that
video dialtone service is not a cable television service under the Cable
Act, and therefore the Cable Act does not apply.
Video dialtone is a legal construct by the FCC of a telecommunica-
tions technology in which the video programmer is an entity distinct
from the owner/operator of the physical facility which transmits the
programming. 9 The physical facility in this case is owned by the local
telephone exchange company. Thus, in essence, video dialtone is a use
of the telephone lines as a pipeline for cable television programmers. By
that legal construct or separation of entities, those providing video dial-
tone services avoid the requirements of the Cable Act, including the
need for a local cable television franchise.
The FCC initially defined "video dialtone" as follows: "Video dial-
tone ... is an enriched version of video common carriage under which
[Local Exchange Companies] will offer various non-programming
services in addition to the underlying video transport... [including] the
transmission of entertainment video programming and other forms of
video communications .... The FCC further explained in 1992 that
in video dialtone service there is
separate control over the creation, selection, and ownership of
video programming from control over the facilities linking the
program supplier and each of its individual viewers or
"subscribers." This separation was designed to comport with
the prohibition of Section 613(b) of the Cable Act against
64. Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 300 (1991)
(first report and order) [hereinafter Preliminary Video Dialtone Order].
65. Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992)
(second report and order, recommendation to Congress and second further notice of pro-
posed rulemaking) [hereinafter First Video Dialtone Order].
66. 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
67. Id. See generally Preliminary Video Dialtone Order, supra note 64; First Video
Dialtone Order, supra note 65.
68. National Cable Television Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 70-73. In 1991, Preliminary Video
Dialtone Order, supra note 64, at 330, and in 1992, First Video Dialtone Order, supra note
65, at 5822-23, the FCC had reached the same conclusion.
69. Preliminary Video Dialtone Order, supra note 64, at 306.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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telephone companies providing video programming directly to
subscribers in telephone service areas.7"
Due to the potential impact of this novel way of avoiding the appli-
cation of the Cable Act, the D.C. Circuit opinion was widely covered in
the national news media.7 ' Almost without exception, these news stories
characterized the court's holding in National Cable Television Ass'n in
much broader terms than in fact was the case, suggesting that the hold-
ing nullified any local franchising requirements and the attendant
franchise fees that local governments may impose on telephone compa-
nies which provide video services. These characterizations by the news
reports of National Cable Television Ass'n created a misconception that
a locally required franchise, as opposed to one required by the Cable
Act, is not required to provide video dialtone service or other new tele-
communications services. In fact, neither the FCC nor the D.C. Circuit
addressed in any way any franchise or right-of-way use agreements re-
quired pursuant to state or local law. The 1991'4 and 1992' FCC orders
and National Cable Television Ass'n only addressed the very narrow
issue of whether the Cable Act applied to video dialtone service. 6 They
held it did not and no more.
1. Local Franchise Requirements for the Provision of
Video Dialtone Service
The FCC video dialtone decisions have given rise to confusion as to
local franchise requirements for providing new telecommunications
services.77 The applicability of local or state franchise requirements to
video dialtone may be questioned by those in the telecommunications
industry because of the lack of clarity in the FCC opinions. As stated
71. Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 5069, 5070
(1992) (memorandum opinion and order on reconsideration) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Jeannine Aversa, Phone Firms Avoid Paying for Cable, THE LEGAL IN-
TELLIGENCER, Aug. 29, 1994, at 9; Jube Shriver, Jr., Telephone Finns Don't Need Local
Franchise For Video, L.A. TnmEs, Aug. 27, 1994, D at 01; Jon Van, Phone Firms Free Of
Franchise Costs, CHI. TIaB., Aug. 27, 1994, Business, at 3; No Franchise Needed In Video
Cable Service, THE NATIONAL LAW JoURNAL, Sept. 12, 1994, at B 4.
73. See Jeannine Aversa, Phone Firms Avoid Paying for Cable, THE LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Aug. 29, 1994, at 9; Jube Shriver, Jr., Telephone Firms Don't Need Local Franchise
For Video, L.A. TWnEs, Aug. 27, 1994, D at 01; Jon Van, Phone Finns Free Of Franchise
Costs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1994, Business, at 3; No Franchise Needed In Video Cable
Service, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 12, 1994, at B 4.
74. Preliminary Video Dialtone Order, supra note 64, at 330.
75. First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 65, at 5822-23.
76. 33 F.3d at 70-73.
77. In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television, CC Docket No. 87-266, 1995 FCC LEXIS
396 (Jan. 20, 1995).
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above, the FCC ruled that "the Cable Act does not mandate that a local
exchange carrier or its customer-programmer obtain a municipal cable
television franchise [under the Cable Act] in order to offer video dial-
tone service.' 78 In reaching that determination, the FCC had a significant
underlying assumption in its analysis. That analysis, discussed in detail
in the subsequent 1992 FCC opinion, assumed that because a local tele-
phone franchise had previously been granted to the local telephone
company, such franchise authorized the use of the local public rights-of-
way.79 The FCC commented that such a local franchise allows and en-
hances "the ability of... local entities to regulate such use [of the local
rights-of-way by the telephone company]."8" The FCC went on to state:
In contrast to cable operators, local telephone companies al-
ready receive authorization to use the public rights-of-way
pursuant to common carrier regulation. Consequently, there is
no basis to infer that Congress intended that local telephone
companies secure a cable television franchise to use the same
rights-of-way they are already authorized to use.8'
Unfortunately, the FCC did not clearly state under which regula-
tions telephone companies had received the prior authorization to use
local public rights-of-way. Still, it refers to a franchise as how that
authorization is accomplished with cable television.'
The FCC also explained in its 1992 opinion that as telephone com-
panies already have a local franchise, which addresses the concerns
about public safety and convenience and use of public rights-of-way,
another franchise is not needed to provide video dialtone service. The
FCC stated:
Since these concerns [about use of the public rights-of-way] are
already addressed by the existing common carrier regulatory
scheme for telephone company facilities [in part by having a lo-
cal telephone franchise], we conclude that Congress did not
intend to subject telephone companies to the duplicative regu-
lation that would occur if we were to find that a cable franchise
is also required for video dialtone facilities.83
78. Preliminary Video Dialtone Order, supra note 64, at 302; see also id. at 324-25 and
330.
79. First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 65, at 5822-23.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 5072 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the FCC's analysis assumed that local telephone companies
providing video dialtone would already have a local franchise permit-
ting use of public rights-of-way.
2. The D.C. Circuit's Narrow Holding in National
Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC
In National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit, in up-
holding the FCC decisions, agreed that video dialtone was not a "cable
service" as defined by the Cable Act, principally because it was only a
conduit for the services.' The court analogized that in providing a video
dialtone service the telephone company is like the post office in deliv-
ering a letter. 5 The telephone company, in providing video dialtone
service, is delivering a video message from one customer to another
customer, but it is not determining in any way what the message is, or
what is sent, or to whom or by whom it is sent.86
The court distinguishes "video dialtone" and "cable service" under
the Cable Act as follows:
[V]ideo dialtone service and cable service are very different
creatures: video dialtone is a common carriage service, the es-
sence of which is an obligation to provide service indifferently
to all comers-here, to provide service to all would-be video
programmers. On the other hand, cable operators exercise "a
significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their
programming will include."87
Video dialtone service is not "video programming" under the Cable
Act definition and thus is not regulated by the Cable Act. Therefore, a
franchise under the Cable Act is not required to provide this service.
The court does not hold or suggest in any way that a local franchise
to use public rights-of-way, as required under state or local law, is
somehow preempted or negated, nor does it state that any local public
rights-of-way can be used without a locally required franchise. The
court, like the FCC, states that it would be duplicative to require an-
other franchise for the non-cable television service of video dialtone, as
the concerns about the public safety and use of rights of way have al-
ready been addressed in that pre-existing franchise.88
84. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66,72-75 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
85. Id. at 71-72.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 75 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979)).
88. National Cable Television Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 73-74.
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The court quoted the House Report on the 1984 Cable Act which
stated that nothing in the Cable Act was "intended to prevent a common
carrier from constructing, subject to applicable law, a local distribution
system that is capable of delivering video programming and other com-
munications... to multiple subscribers within a community." 9
In other words, if applicable state or local law requires a local fran-
chise to use public rights-of-way for that distribution system, those
applicable local laws must be adhered to prior to providing the video
dialtone service.
Thus, neither the FCC's video dialtone decisions nor the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinion addressed, in any way, local franchising requirements as
required by applicable state or local law for providing video dialtone
service. In fact, as has been noted above, the FCC predicated its opinion
that no additional local cable television franchise was required to pro-
vide video dialtone service on the existing regulatory schemes which
had already authorized use of the local public rights-of-way and already
protected the local interest. The principal components of those regula-
tory schemes are right-of-way use agreements, typically by a local
franchise to use the streets.
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
In legislation proposed but not adopted on the "information super-
highway" in the 103rd Session of Congress, particularly the
Brooks/DingelU Bill," the Markey/Fields Bill (which passed out of the
House after it was incorporated into the Brooks/Dingell Bill H.R.) 9' and
the Hollings Bill,92 there were several sections with very broad language
concerning preemption of state and local regulatory authority.
89. Id. at 71 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), U.S.C.C.A.N.
1984, p. 4655) (emphasis added).
90. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(a) (1994) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 201(c)(3))
("Preemption... [N]o State or local government may... effectively prohibit any person or
carrier from providing any interstate or intrastate telecommunication service or information
service, or impose any restriction or condition on entry into the business of providing any
such service.").
91. H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (This bill was reported out of the House
Committee with several new amendments. One was to exclude the "new" telecommunica-
tions revenue from the franchise fee base of the cable television franchise. Another amend-
ment required "local franchise fee parity." If those two amendments had both been applied,
current franchise fee charges on telephone franchises could have been challenged.).
92. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 230(a) (1994) ("[N]o State or local statute or regu-
lation, or other State or local legal requirement, shall prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide interstate or intrastate telecommunication
services.").
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Again, in the current 104th Congress, H.R. 411 was filed on January
4, 1995, by Rep. Markey, together with Rep. Dingell and Rep. Cony-
ers. 93 This bill includes some of the same broad, problematic clauses that
were in last session's bills regarding preemption of state and local
authority to regulate telecommunications services in their state or local
area.' For instance, section 302(a) of the legislation provides the fol-
lowing preemption language:
(c)(3) PREEMPTION.
(A) Limitation.... [N]o state or local government may...
(i) effectively prohibit any person or carrier from providing
any interstate or intrastate telecommunication service or infor-
mation service, or impose any restriction or condition on the
entry into the business providing any such service ......
Telecommunications service companies may argue that these sec-
tions not only preempt or supersede state and local authority to regulate
interstate telecommunications providers, but perhaps also even prohibit
state or local governments from requiring compensation for the use of
local public property.
A narrow exception to this preemption allows state and local regu-
lation that is "necessary and appropriate to ... protect public safety and
welfare,"96 and that provides for "normal construction permits."'97
The bill allows, in section 302, for cable companies to provide other
telecommunications services (including, presumably, telephone serv-
ices)98 and, in section 401, for local exchange telephone companies to
provide cable services." Section 302(a) also provides that all franchise
fees and charges should be equivalent for all telecommunications op-
erators."° In section 659(a)(3), the bill exempts video services provided
by a telephone company from the franchise requirements of the Cable
Act (including franchise fees),"0' yet section 659(b)(2) of the bill re-
quires local franchise fees to be charged that are comparable to Cable
93. H.R. 411, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (amending scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
94. Id. § 302(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) (1995).
95. Id. § 302(a) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 201 by adding subsection (c)(3)) (emphasis
added).
96. Id. § 302(a) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 201 by adding subsection (c)(3)(B)(i)).
97. Id. § 302(a) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 201 by adding subsection (c)(3)(C)).
98. Id. § 302.
99. Id. § 401.
100. Id. § 302(a).
101. Id. § 659(a)(3).
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Act fees on such revenue." However, section 302(b)(1) of the bill
amends section 541(c) of the Cable Act to restrict the application of
franchise fees on cable operators to apply only to cable service revenue,
thereby excluding any telephone or other telecommunications service
revenue from a cable operator's franchise fee base.0 3 The result of sec-
tion 659 and section 302(b)(1) is a nonparity of fees. These provisions,
taken together, could jeopardize existing franchise fee agreements of
cable companies, telephone companies and other competitive access
providers.""
IT[. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that Con-
gress cannot appropriate state and local public streets and rights-of-way
for the use and benefit of third parties without compensation, the
authority actually to receive compensation for the use of state and local
public properties is contingent on state law. The misconception (which
has grown to almost a mythical proportion) that somehow federal regu-
latory oversight in the telecommunications area has wholly negated the
need or authority of state and local governments to require a local tele-
communications street franchise under the existing applicable state or
local law prior to use of public property should not continue. FCC ac-
tion and federal legislation should be monitored and revised or
challenged if necessary to avoid any ambiguity that may give rise to
litigation in this area. However, based upon the present law, in the event
of such litigation, state and local governments should prevail.
102. IL § 659(b)(2).
103. Id. § 302(b)(1) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 541(c)).
104. At the time of final publication of this article there recently has been a Senate Bill,
S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), introduced by Senator Pressler. That Senate Bill ap-
pears to address some of the issues raised in the article with regard to the parity issue of
franchise fees. As presented, it allows "competitively neutral" franchise fees to be applied to
both cable television operators providing telephone service and telephone companies pro-
viding cable service, i.e., both "new" sources of revenue being subject to franchise fees. Id.
at § 201(a) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)).
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